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Comments
The Reasonable Use Rule in Surface
Water Law
I. INTRODUCTION
"Surface water" is a term used to describe water that occurs "on the
surface of the earth in places other than definite streams or lakes or ponds."'
The primary sources of surface water are falling rain and melting snow, but
it may originate from any source.2 Disputes involving' surface waters are
most likely to occur between adjoining landowners where one parcel of land
is on a higher plane. Either the upper landowner participates in an activity to
naturally or artificially increase the flow onto the lower landowner's property
thereby causing damage,3 or the lower landowner diverts the natural flow of
the water by backing up the water on the upper landowner's property These
types of disputes are occurring increasingly in urban areas where pavement
and other structures increase the flow of surface water and developers have
not adequately anticipated the runoff.5
Much has been written about surface water law.6 This Comment is not
1. Charles E. Bridges, Comment, The Application of Surface Water Rules in
Urban Areas, 42 Mo. L. REV. 76, 76 n.3 (1977).
2. Id.; see also Frank E. Maloney & Sheldon J. Plager, Diffused Surface Water:
Scourge or Bounty, 8 NAT. REsOURCES J. 72, 72 (1968) ("[r]ain is by far the greatest
source of surface water... [h]eavy but seasonal rainfall frequently results in periodic
overabundance of surface waters which overtax natural and artificial drainage systems
as well as the capacity of the soil to absorb water").
3. E.g., Argyelan v. Haviland, 435 N.E.2d 973 (Ind. 1982).
4. E.g., M.H. Siegfried Real Estate v. City of Independence, 649 S.W.2d 893
(Mo. 1983) (en bane).
5. Bridges, supra note 1, at 76.
6. See, e.g., 5 ROBERT E. BECK, WATER AND WATER RIGHTS 477-646, (Robert
E. Clark ed., 1972 & Supp. 1978); 7 CLIFFORD DAVIS ET AL., WATER AND WATER
RIGHTs 139-56 (Robert E. Clark ed., 1976); Clifford Davis, Law of Diffused Water in
Eastern Riparian States, 6 CONN. L. REV. 227 (1974); Lawrence 0. Davis, The Law
of Surface Water in Missouri, 24 Mo. LAW REV. 137 (1959); Geo. H. English, Jr., The
Law of Surface Water as Applicable to Missouri and States Bound by Large Rivers,
51 CENT. L.J. 360 (1900); Eva Morreal Hanks, Law of Waters in New Jersey, 22
RUTGERs L. REV. 621 (1968); Stanley V. Kinyon & Robert C. McClure, Interferences
With Surface Waters, 24 MINN. L. REV. 891 (1940); Maloney & Plager, supra note 2
at 73-75; John R. Rood, Surface Water in Cities, 6 MICH. L. REV. 448 (1908); J. C.
Thompson, Surface Waters, 23 AM. U. L. REV. 372 (1889); Bridges, supra, note 1 at
1
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meant to explore some new aspect of surface water law, as there is seemingly
no area left untouched by scholars. Instead, this Comment is meant to update
the status of surface water law in each of the fifty states and the District of
Columbia. It will also touch upon the current approach of Missouri
concerning surface water law. This Comment is not a comprehensive guide
to the intricacies of surface water law. Instead, it will provide the practitioner
with a status report of the law as it appears today and with an explanation of
the trends in this area of the law.7
II. BACKGROUND
Generally, jurisdictions treat surface water disputes according to one of
three principles: (1) the civil law rule; (2) the common enemy rule; and (3) the
reasonable use rule. The first two rules are grounded in property law. They
have been substantially modified since their inception. The basic premise of
all three views is discussed below. Each view stems from different public
policy concerns and each was adopted according to the prevalent views of the
respective jurisdiction.
A. The Civil Law Rule
The civil law rule holds that "a person who interferes with the natural
flow of surface waters so as to cause an invasion of another's interest in the
use and enjoyment of his land is subject to liability to the other."8 The civil
law is based on a theory of servitude. Upper owners have no right to alter the
76; James Golembeck, Comment, Waters and Water Courses-Torts-Owners of
Property Damage by Unlawful Ditching or Unreasonable Discharge of Waters May
Obtain Relief by Statute or by the Tort Concept of Reasonable Use, 60 N.D. L. REV.
741 (1984); Henry A. Shutz III & Jim B. Tohill, Comment, Diffused Surface Waters
in Mississippi, 46 Miss. L.J. 118 (1975); Janet Fairchild, Annotation, Modern Status
ofRules Governing Interference with Drainage of Surface Waters, 93 A.L.R.3D 1196,
1216 (1979 & Supp. 1991).
7. Surface water law should not be confused with riparian water rights. See
generally Roberts v. Hooker, 610 S.W.2d 321 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (the law
distinguishes a watercourse from surface water by separate definitions and separate
consequences); Pendergrast v. Aiken, 236 S.E.2d 787, 794 (N.C. 1977) (comparison
of surface water law to development of riparian rights); Kinyon & McClure, supra
note 6, at 892 ("in most jurisdictions there is a separate and distinct law of surface
water which in many respects differs markedly from the law applicable in the same
jurisdictions to watercourses, subterranean waters, and private nuisances in general").
8. Kinyon & McClure, supra note 6, at 893.
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natural system of drainage to the detriment of lower owners. Likewise, lower
owners must accept the water that drains onto their land.9
The civil law rule was originally adopted from the civil codes of foreign
nations. It was based on the natural law maxim of aqua currit et debet
currere ut currere sole bat (i.e., water runs and ought to run, as it used to
run).'0 Commentators have suggested that the real reason for the adoption
of this rule is the idea that "the least harmful way to dispose of surface waters
is to enforce the natural laws of drainage."" The rule is justified by the
concept that "those purchasing or acquiring land should expect and be required
to accept it subject to the burdens of natural drainage." 12 This approach
tends to place the cost of repair and damages on landowners who improve
their property because the development often changes the natural drainage
system.' Opponents criticize this rule for inhibiting growth and discourag-
ing land development, although there is some debate over whether it actually
has discouraged developers.14
Courts adopting the civil law rule have made modifications or qualifica-
tions to the rule so as not to discourage development.'5 Many courts have
adopted a "reasonable use" modification to the civil law rule. The leading
case on the reasonable use modification is Keys v. Romley. x6 In Keys, the
California Supreme Court adopted the reasonable use modification to the civil
law rule.17 The court recognized the harshness of the original civil law rule:
"[N]o rule can be applied by a court of justice with utter disregard for the
peculiar facts and circumstances of the parties and the properties involved."'"
Therefore, neither upper nor lower landowners are allowed to act arbitrarily
9. Bridges, supra note 1, at 78.
10. Kinyon & McClure, supra note 6, at 894-95; see also Grosso v. Long Island
Lighting Co., 424 N.Y.S.2d 979, 982 (Co. Ct. 1980).
11. Bridges, supra note 1, at 79 (citing Kinyon & McClure, supra note 6, at 895).
12. Keys v. Romley, 412 P.2d 529, 532 (Cal. 1966).
.13. Bridges, supra note 1, at 79.
14. Id. at 80.
15. Id. at 796 n.26. Because many jurisdictions are especially concerned about
discouraging development in urban areas, some have simply rejected the civil law for
urban areas while adopting it for rural areas.
16. 412 P.2d 529 (Cal. 1966); see also Mark Downs, Inc. v. McCormick
Properties, Inc., 441 A.2d 1119, 1126 (Md. Ct. App. 1982) (reasonableness of use
modification to civil law rule adopted to ameliorate the harshness of the traditional
rule-"a balance of benefit and harm is struck in hardship cases, to make sure that the
owner of the servient estate is not unreasonably denied use of his property"). For a
more detailed discussion, see Bridges, supra note 1, at 80-81; Maloney & Plager,
supra note 2, at 79-81.
17. Keys, 412 P.2d at 537.
18. Id at 536.
1992]
3
Graham: Graham: Reasonable Use Rule
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1992
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
or unreasonably and still be immune from liability. 19 This modification also
creates a duty on any person threatened with injury by surface waters to take
reasonable precautions to avoid or reduce any actual or potential injury.20
For jurisdictions adopting a reasonable use modification, the general civil
law rule can be stated as follows:
[Tihe upper owner may improve and enhance the natural drainage of his
land so long as he acts reasonably and does not divert the flow, and that the
lower owner is subject to an easement for such flow as the upper owner is
allowed to cast upon him.2'
In 1940, Stanley Kinyon and Robert McClure compiled a list of all the
jurisdictions adopting the civil law rule. 2 Each jurisdiction had its own
qualifications and modifications, which are beyond the scope of this Comment
and will not be discussed. The following eighteen jurisdictions were listed as
adopting the civil law rule: Alabama,' California,' Colorado,28 Geor-
gia,2 Illinois,2" Iowa,28  Kansas, 2' Kentucky, -0  Louisiana,3  Mary-
19. Id.
20. Id. at 537.
21. Maloney & Plager, supra note 2, at 77.
22. See Kinyon & McClure, supra note 6, at 896.
23. Southern Ry. Co. v. Lewis, 51 So. 746 (Ala. 1910); Tennessee A. & G. Ry.
Co. v. Cardon, 177 So. 171 (Ala. Ct. App. 1937).
24. Le Brun v. Richards, 291 P. 825 (Cal. 1930); Gray v. McWilliams, 32 P. 976
(Cal. 1893).
25. Debevitz v. New Bratner Extension Ditch Co., 241 P. 1111 (Colo. 1925); City
of Boulder v. Boulder & White Rock Ditch & Reservoir Co., 216 P. 553 (Colo. 1923).
26. Hendrix v. McEachem, 139 S.E. 9 (Ga. 1927); Farkas v. Towns, 29 S.E. 700
(Ga. 1897).
27. Beechley v. Harms, 163 N.E. 387 (I1. 1928); Chicago, P. & St. L. Ry. v.
Renter, 79 N.E. 166 (II1. 1906).
28. Herman v. Drew, 249 N.W. 277 (Iowa 1933); Young v. Scott, 250 N.W. 484
(Iowa 1933).
29. Skinner v. Wolf, 266 P. 926 (Kan. 1928); Martin v. Lown, 208 P. 565 (Kan.
1922).
30. Dugan v. Long, 28 S.W.2d 765 (Ky. Ct. App. 1930); Johnson v. Marcum, 153
S.W. 959 (Ky. Ct. App. 1913).
31. Bolinger v. Murray, 137 So. 761 (La. Ct. App. 1931).
[Vol. 57
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land,32 Michigan,33 Nevada,-" North Carolina,35 Ohio, 36 Pennsylvania, 37
South Dakotam Tennessee,39 and Texas.'
Modem approaches in several states have caused some attrition in the
ranks of the civil law rule. This change is explored in Section III below.
B. The Common Enemy Rule
Traditionally, the common enemy rule could be stated as giving a
possessor of land "an unlimited and unrestricted legal privilege to deal with
the surface water on his land as he pleases, regardless of the harm which he
may thereby cause to others."41 The basis of this rule is found in the maxim
cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum et ad inferos (i.e., whose is the soil,
his is even to the skies and to the depths below).4"
Commentators have attributed the adoption of the common enemy rule
to three public policies. First, the traditional concept of ownership dictated
that landowners should be able to do as they please with their land. 3
Second, courts adopting the rule thought it represented the English common
law." The third and most relied upon public policy for the common enemy
rule is the notion that the rule favors land improvement and development 5
By absolving the developer of liability for any damage caused by the diffusion
of surface waters, new construction would be encouraged. This policy has
32. Baltimore & S.P.R.R. Co. v. Hackett, 39 A. 510 (Md. Ct. App. 1898).
33. Crane v. Valley Land Co., 169 N.W. 18 (Mich. 1918).
34. Bynton v. Longlcy, 6 P. 437 (Nev. 1885).
35. Winchester v. Byers, 145 S.E. 774 (N.C. 1928); Proter v. Durham, 74 N.C.
767 (1876).
36. Henicle v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 197 N.E. 360 (Ohio Ct. App. 1934).
37. Martin v. Riddle, 26 Pa. 415 (1848); Kauffman v. Griesemer, 26 Pa. 407
(1856).
38. Thompson v. Andrews, 165 N.W. 9 (S.D. 1917).
39. Davis v. Louisville & N.R.R. Co., 244 S.W. 483 (Tenn. 1922).
40. Calhoun v. Baize, 114 S.W.2d 634 (Tex. Ct. App. 1938); Roby v. Hawthorne,
77 S.W.2d 923 (Tex. Ct. App. 1934).
41. Kinyon & McClure, supra note 6, at 898.
42. Grosso v. Long Island Lighting Co., 424 N.Y.S.2d 979, 979 (Co. Ct. 1980).
43. Kinyon & McClure, supra note 6, at 898-89 n.35.
44. Id. at 899. For a discussion of English cases involving the, common enemy
rule see id at 899-90. See also Davis, supra note 6, at 150 (term "common enemy"
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been especially persuasive in urban areas where development and growth has
been promoted.46
The rule in its original form was particularly harsh to lower landowners
who were forced to receive damaging surface water without any type of
compensation for the injury to their land. Indeed, the burden and costs of
development caused by the diversion of surface waters were placed on
innocent lower landowners. Because of the potential harshness of these
results, a substantial number of jurisdictions have modified the common
enemy rule.
Two major modifications to the rule are worth noting. The first has been
labeled the "collection and discharge" modification. 47 It prohibits landowners
from collecting surface water in a body and discharging it on adjoining
landowners to their injury.48
The second modification has been labeled the "due care" modification.
49
With this modification, "the court's determination is limited to whether a
landowner used 'due care' or 'reasonable care' or was 'without negligence'
in improving his land." '5  This rule does not completely alleviate the
harshness of the original rule. In a 'due care' jurisdiction, if dominant
landowners divert surface water flow to the injury of their neighbors, they will
only be liable to the servient landowners if they were negligent or if they did
not act with due care. If the dominant landowners were not negligent, the
servient landowners will still be forced to bear the costs of the damage and
thus the costs of development.51
The distinction between the civil law rule and common enemy rule has
been summarized as follows:
The basic premise of the civil law rule is that neither landowner may
interfere with the natural flow of surface waters, and upon the owner who
46. Bridges, supra note 1, at 85. Some civil law jurisdictions have even adopted
the common enemy rule for urban areas. Id. E.g., Dekl v. Vann, 182 So.' 2d 885
(Ala. 1966) (applies civil law to rural areas, but common enemy rule to cities, towns,
and villages).
47. Bridges, supra note 1, at 87.
48. Id.; see Davis, supra note 6, at 151 (original common enemy rule allowed
such action by dominant owner, "but the injustice of it was too apparent to be
acceptable in later cases").
49. Bridges, supra note 1, at 87.
50. Id. at 88 (citations omitted). This modification is not to be confused with the
reasonable use rule to be discussed infra at notes 75-87 and accompanying text. The
reasonable use rule is a balancing test between the utility of the actor's conduct and
the gravity of harm caused by the alteration of surface water flow. Bridges, supra note
1, at 88.
51. Bridges, supra note 1, at 88.
[Vol. 57
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does so would go the burden of proving that his interference falls within
one of the recognized exceptions. Under the common enemy rule, a
landowner starts with the unqualified right to do as he pleases and it is for
the injured neighbor to show that his conduct falls within one of the
modifications to that rule
5 2
In their 1940 article, Kinyon and McClure listed twenty-two jurisdictions
adopting the common enemy rule. Each of these jurisdictions has adopted
modifications and qualifications that are beyond the scope of this Comment:
Arizona,53 Arkansas,5 4 Connecticut,55 District of Columbia, " Indiana, 7
Maine, "  Massachusetts,59 Mississippi,' Missouri,61 Montana,' Nebras-
ka,' New Jersey," New Mexico,' New York,' North Dakota,67 Okla-
homa," Rhode Island,69 South Carolina,70  Virginia,
71
' Washington,72
West Virginia, 73 and Wisconsin.74
52. Maloney & Plager, supra note 2, at 79.
53. Roosevelt Irr. Dist. v. Beardsley Land & Inv. Co., 282 P. 937 (Ariz. 1929).
54. Little Rock & Fort Smith Ry. v. Chapman, 39 Ark. 463 (1882).
55. Tide Water Oil Sales Corp. v. Shimelman, 158 A. 229 (Conn. 1932).
56. Pearce v. Scott, 29 F.2d 630 (D.C. Cir. 1928).
57. Ramsey v. Ketcham, 127 N.E. 204 (Ind. Ct. App. 1920).
58. Murphy v. Kelley, 68 Me. 521 (1878); Morrison v. Bucksport & Bangor R.R.,
67 Me. 353 (1877).
59. Maddock v. City of Springfield, 183 N.E. 148 (Mass. 1932).
60. Columbus & G. Ry. v. Taylor, 115 So. 200 (Miss. 1928).
61. Tackett v. Linnenbrink, 112 S.W.2d 160 (Mo. Ct. App. 1938); Place v. Union
Township, 66 S.W.2d 584 (Mo. Ct. App. 1936).
62. Le Munyon v. Gallatin Valley Ry., 199 P. 915 (Mont. 1921).
63. Muhleisen v. Krueger, 232 N.W. 735 (Neb. 1930); Aldritt v. Fleischauer, 103
N.W. 1084 (Neb. 1905).
64. Nathanson v. Wagner, 179 A. 466 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1935); Fitz-
patrick v. Gourley, 145 A. 337 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1929).
65. Walker v. New Mexico & S.P.R.R., 165 U.S. 593 (1897).
66. Carrabis v. Brooklyn Ash Removal Co., 291 N.Y.S. 840 (App. Div. 1936).
67. Henderson v. Hines, 183 N.W. 531 (N.D. 1921).
68. Castle v. Reeburgh, 181 P. 297 (Okla. 1919).
69. Johnson v. White, 58 A. 658 (R.I. 1904).
70. Fairey v. Southern Ry., 160 S.E. 274 (S.C. 1931); Rivenbark v. Atlantic Coast
Line Ry., 117 S.E. 206 (S.C. 1923).
71. McGehee v. Tidewater Ry., 62 S.E. 356 (Va. 1908).
72. Morton v. Hines, 192 P. 1016 (Wash. 1920); Miller v. Eastern Ry. & Lumber
Co., 146 P. 171 (Wash. 1915).
73. Jordan v. City of Benwood, 26 S.E. 266 (W. Va. 1896).
74. Harvie v. Town of Calendonia, 154 N.W. 383 (Wis. 1915).
1992]
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As with the civil law rule, the common enemy rule has lost support since
the 1940's. The shift away from this approach is explored in Section III
below.
C. Reasonable Use Rule
The reasonable use rule states that each landowner "is legally privileged
to make a reasonable use of his land, even though the flow of surface waters
is altered thereby and causes harm to others."75 Liability is only incurred
when the interference with the surface water is unreasonable. 76 Under this
rule, a new maxim controls: sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedus (i.e., use
your property in such manner as not to injure that of another)."
The reasonable use rule differs significantly from the civil law rule and
the common enemy rule in several respects. The earlier rules were based
solely on property principles of servitude and absolute ownership; the
reasonable use rule is based on tort principles." Indeed, the reasonable use
rule has been adopted by the American Law Institute in the Restatement
(Second) of Torts.79 This rule also differs from the others because it is
applied on a case-by-case basis, while the other rules are applied the same
way in every case, regardless of the outcome.
This rule of reasonable use differs from the other two rules in that it does
not purport to lay down any specific rights or privileges with respect to
surface water, but leaves the whole matter to be determined upon the facts
of each case in accordance with general principles of fairness and common
sense.
Several courts have a reasonable use test whereby defendants' actions of
draining their land of surface waters and casting them on the land of another
is deemed reasonable if (1) there is a reasonable necessity for such drainage;
(2) if reasonable care is taken to avoid unnecessary injury to the land
receiving the burden; (3) if the utility or benefit accruing to the land drained
reasonably outweighs the gravity of the harm resulting to the land receiving
75. Kinyon & McClure, supra note 6, at 904.
76. Id.
77. Grosso v. Long Island Lighting Co., 424 N.Y.S.2d 979, 982 (Co. Ct. 1980).
78. Maloney & Plager, supra note 2, at 79.
79. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 821A-833 (1979). Section 833 reads:
"An invasion of one's interest in the use and enjoyment of land resulting from
another's interference with the flow of surface water may constitute a nuisance under
the rules stated in §§ 821A-831." Id.
80. Kinyon & McClure, supra note 6, at 905.
[Vol. 57
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the burden; and (4) if, where practicable, it is accomplished by reasonably
improving and aiding the normal and natural system of drainage according to
its reasonable carrying capacity, or if, in the absence of practicable natural
drainage, a reasonable and feasible artificial drainage system is adopted.81
The reasonable use rule is a balancing test between the utility of the
actor's conduct and the gravity of harm caused by the diversion of surface
watersY2 One of the earliest cases adopting the rule stated that the circum-
stances a court should consider to determine reasonableness include "the
nature and importance of the improvements sought to be made, the extent of
the interference with the water, and the amount of injury done to the other
landowners as compared with the value of such improvements."'
By 1940, only two jurisdictions had adopted the reasonable use rule:
New Hampshire, and Minnesota.5 Why such a sound and desirable rule
had not been more accepted is unclear, especially considering that it had been
around almost as long as the other two rules.' Kinyon and McClure
attributed the lack of acceptance to confusion and misinterpretation of the rule
and its role in the area of surface water law.87 As seen in the next section,
this "confusion" no longer exists, and many jurisdictions have now whole-
heartedly embraced the reasonable use rule.
III. STATUS OF SURFACE WATER LAW TODAY
As stated above, in their 1940 article Kinyon and McClure reported that
eighteen jurisdictions had adopted some form of the civil law rule, twenty-two
had adopted some form of the common enemy rule, and two had adopted the
reasonable use rule. These numbers have changed significantly over the last
fifty years.
Today, seventeen jurisdictions still follow the civil law rule. Only
thirteen jurisdictions still follow some form of the common enemy rule.
81. Klutey v. Commonwealth, 428 S.W.2d 766, 770 (Ky. 1968); Quist v.
Kroening, 410 N.W.2d 5,6-7 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987); Martin v. Weckerly, 364 N.W.2d
93, 95 (N.D. 1983); see also Dudley v. Beckey, 567 A.2d 573, 575 (N.H. 1989) (in
determining reasonableness, court should consider (1) the extent of the alternation of
natural or existing runoff patterns; (2) the importance and nature of the land and its
use; and (3) the foreseeability and magnitude of any damages).
82. Bridges, supra note 1, at 88.
83. Swett v. Cutts, 50 N.H. 439, 446 (1870).
84. City of Franklin v. Durgee, 51 A. 911 (N.H. 1901); Town of Rindge v.
Sargent, 9 A. 723 (N.H. 1886).
85. Bush v. City of Rochester, 255 N.W. 256 (Minn. 1934).
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Instead of two jurisdictions following the reasonable use rule, today twenty
jurisdictions have adopted the reasonable use rule.
The following jurisdictions still follow the civil law rule: Alabama,8
Colorado, 89  Georgia, 90  Idaho, 9' Illinois,9
2  Iowa, 93  Kansas,9 4
88. Robichaux v. Albie Dev. Co., 551 So. 2d 1017 (Ala. 1989); Street v. Tackett,
494 So. 2d 13 (Ala. 1986) (civil law rule modified by reasonable use concept where
surface water flows from upper landowner in an incorporated area to property of lower
landowner in unincorporated area); Dekle v. Vann, 182 So. 2d 885 (Ala. 1966) (applies
civil law to rural areas, but applies common enemy rule as to cities, towns, and village
lots).
89. Hankins v. Borland, 431 P.2d 1007 (Colo. 1967) (natural drainage conditions
may be altered by an upper proprietor provided the water is not sent down in a manner
or quantity to do more harm than formerly); Howard v. Cactus Hill Ranch Co., 529
P.2d 660 (Colo. Ct. App. 1974).
90. Morris v. Cummings, 116 S.E.2d 592 (Ga. 1960); Gill v. First Christian
Church, 117 S.E.2d 164 (Ga. 1960) (modified by collect and discharge modifica-
tion-there is no right to concentrate and collect water and thus cause it to be
discharged upon the land of a lower proprietor in greater quantities or in a different
manner than if it ran down by law of gravitation).
91. Loosli v. Heseman, 162 P.2d 393 (Idaho 1945); Merrill v. Penrod, 704 P.2d
950 (Idaho Ct. App. 1985) (qualified by reasonable use concept-upper landowner,
while having the undoubted right to make a reasonable use of the water for irrigation,
must so use, manage, and control it as not to injure his neighbor's land).
92. Dessen v. Jones, 551 N.E.2d 782 (i1. App. Ct. 1990) (two exceptions to civil
law rule: (1) railroad exception and (2) good husbandry exception permitting owner
of dominated agricultural land to increase or alter the flow of surface water upon a
servient estate if this is required for proper husbandry of the dominant land); Mileur
v. McBride, 498 N.E.2d 581 (I1. App. Ct. 1986) (no reasonable use exception in cases
of urban land).
93. O'Toole v. Hathaway, 461 N.W.2d 161 (Iowa 1990) (qualification-"an
overriding requirement [is] that one must exercise ordinary care in the use of his
property so as not to injure the rights of neighboring landowners"); Oak Leaf Country
Club v. Wilson, 257 N.W.2d 739 (Iowa 1977).
94. Goering v. Schrag, 207 P.2d 391 (Kan. 1949); Clawson v. Garrison, 592 P.2d
117 (Kan. Ct. App. 1979); see also KAN. STAT. ANN. § 24-105 (1986) ("[tit shall be
unlawful for a landowner or proprietor to construct or maintain a dam or levee which
has the effect of obstructing or collecting and discharging with increased force and
volume the flow of surface water to the damage of the adjacent owner or proprietor").
[Vol. 57
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Louisiana,95 Maryland,96 Michigan, 97 New Mexico," Oregon," Pennsyl-
vania,'00 South Dakota,'O Tennessee, °2 Texas, °3 and Vermont."
The jurisdictions still following the common enemy rule are Arkan-
sas,"°  Arizona,"°  District of Columbia, 7 Indiana,"°  Maine,'09 Miss-
95. Thigpen v. Moss, 504 So. 2d 664, 666 (La. Ct. App. 1987) ("[O]wner of the
dominant estate may cut ditches and canals which concentrate and speed natural flow
of surface waters... [but] are not entitled to concentrate flow of surface waters so as
to flow on the lower lands of defendants at point which would not be their natural
destination and thereby increase the volume of water which would be natural flow run
over defendants' servient estate and thus render the servitude estate more burden-
some.").
96. Mark Downs, Inc. v. McCormick Properties, 441 A.2d 1119 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1982) (qualified by reasonableness concept).
97. Schmidt v. Eger, 289 N.W.2d 851, 886 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980) ("the owner
of the dominant estate may not require the owner of the servient estate to accept a
greater runoff by increasing or concentrating the flow").
98. Budagher v. Amrep Corp., 637 P.2d 547 (N.M. 1981) ("landowner does not
have the right to collect surface water in an artificial channel and discharge it upon his
neighbor's lands to his injury, in a different manner or in a greater volume or at a
greater rate than it would have flowed naturally"); Gutierrez v. Rio Rancho Estates,
Inc., 605 P.2d 1154 (N.M. 1980).
99. Garbarino v. Van Cleave, 330 P.2d 28 (Or. 1958).
100. LaForm v. Bethlehem Township, 499 A.2d 1373 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985)
(upper landowners only liable for effect of surface water where they (1) diverted the
water from its natural channel by artificial means, or (2) unreasonably or unnecessarily
increased the quantity or changed the qualify of water discharged on their neighbors);
Ridgeway Court v. Landon Courts, 442 A.2d 246 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982).
101. Gross v. Connecticutt Mut. Life Ins. Co., 361 N.W.2d 259 (S.D. 1985)
(modification-cannot collect surface water or permit it to be collected and then be
cast upon the servient estate in unusual or unnatural quantities).
102. Blackwell v. Butler, 582 S.W.2d 760 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1978) ("any substantial
or essential interference with the flow, if wrongful, whether attended with actual
damage or not, is an actionable nuisance").
103. Kraft v. Langford, 565 S.W.2d 223 (Tex. 1978); Mitchell v. Blomdahl, 730
S.W.2d 791 (rex. Ct. App. 1987) (adopted civil law rule by statute).
104. Powers v. Judd, 553 A.2d 139 (Vt. 1988) ("upper property owner cannot
artificially increase the natural flow of water to a lower property owner or change its
manner of flow by discharging it onto the lower land at a different place from its
natural discharge").
105. Boyd v. Greene County, 644 S.W.2d 615, 616-17 (Ark.' Ct. App. 1983)
("[w]here no watercourse exists, Arkansas has adopted the common law rule that a
landowner is justified in defending against surface runoff without incurring liability for
damages unless injury is unnecessarily inflicted upon another which, by reasonable
effort and expense, could have been avoided").
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ouri,n0  Montana,"' Nebraska," 2  New York,13  Oklahoma,114  South
Carolina,"5 Virginia, 16 and Washington.
1 7
106. Bahman v. Estes Homes, 710 P.2d 1087, 1090 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985)
(quoting Gillespie Land & Irrigation Co. v. Gonzales, 379 P.2d 135, 145 (Ariz. 1963))
(modification-landowners may not divert the natural waters of a stream in such a
manner that these waters cause damage to their neighbor, and landowners have no right
to collect surface runoff water from artificial channels and cause it to erode or flow
to neighboring homeowners' lands).
107. Ballard v. Ace Wrecking Co., 289 A.2d 888 (D.C. 1972) (reasonable use
modification-landowners must exercise right in good faith and with such care as not
to injure needlessly the property of adjacent owners).
108. Argyelan v. Haviland, 435 N.E.2d 973 (Ind. 1982).
109. Johnson v. Whitten, 384 A.2d 698 (Me. 1978).
110. Looney v. Hindman 649 S.W.2d 207 (Mo. 1983) (en banc) (modified by
"due care" and "collect and discharge" modification).
111. State ex rel v. Feenam, 752 P.2d 182, 184 (Mont. 1988) (emphasis added)
(landowners not liable for vagrant surface water that crosses their land and goes onto
their neighbor's land, but landowners are "limited to reasonable care in avoiding
damage to adjoining property").
112. Gruber v. County of Dawson, 439 N.W.2d 446, 453 (Neb. 1989) ("surface
waters may be dammed, diverted, or otherwise repelled by an adjoining landowner
without liability if it is necessary and done without negligence"); Barry v.
Wittmersehouse, 327 N.W.2d 33 (Neb. 1982) (surface water is common enemy, and
no liability for defending yourself against its encroachment provided that landowner
exercises ordinary care and he so used his property as not to unnecessarily and
negligently injure another).
113. Grosso v. Long Island Lighting Co., 424 N.Y.S.2d 979, 982 (Co. Ct. 1980)
("each landowner has absolute right to cast off surface waters as he sees fit, provided
improvements are made in good faith to fit the property for some rational use for
which it is adapted, and that water is not drained onto the other's property by pipes,
drains or channels").
114. Dobbs v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 416 F. Supp. 5 (D. Okla. 1975) (landowners
not allowed to sacrifice their neighbors' property to protect their own property);
Haenchen v. Sand Prods. Co., 626 P.2d 332, 334 (Okla. Ct. App. 1981) ("the same
rule of accrual applies to cases sounding in wrongful diversion of surface waters as in
cases sounding in trespass through construction of permanent improvements").
115. Irwin v. Michelin Tire Corp., 341 S.E.2d 783 (S.C. 1986) (two exceptions
to common enemy rule: (1) if it involves creation of nuisance, or (2) it relates to the
collection and discharge of surface water in a concentrated form upon one's neighbor);
Suddeth v. Knight, 314 S.E.2d 11 (S.C. Ct. App. 1984) (sets forth the exception
regarding nuisance).
116. Mullins v. Greer, 311 S.E.2d 110, 112 (Va. 1984) (landowner can fight off
surface water as best he can "provided he does so reasonably and in good faith and not
wantonly, unnecessarily or carelessly").
117. Kelly v. Gifford, 386 P.2d 415 (Wash. 1963).
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The jurisdictions that have adopted the reasonable use rule are Alas-
ka,"1 8  California," 9  Connecticut,120  Delaware,'
2
' Florida,1 22
Hawaii, 23  Kentucky,124  Massachusetts, 25  Minnesota, 2 6
Mississippi, 27  Nevada,"2 New Hampshire, 129 New Jersey, 30  North
Carolina,' North Dakota, 32 Ohio,' 33 Rhode Island," Utah,' 35 West
Virginia," and Wisconsin. 37
There is one state that has not yet decided which of the three possible
rules of surface water it should adopt. That state is Wyoming.1"
Since the Kinyon and McClure article in 1940, there has been a
significant increase in the number of jurisdictions adopting the reasonable use
118. Ostrem v. Alycska Pipeline Serv. Co., 648 P.2d 986 (Alaska 1982);
Weinberg v. Northern Alaska Dev. Corp., 384 P.2d 450 (Alaska 1963).
119. Aalso v. Leslie Salt Co., 267 Cal. Rptr. 43 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990); Ellison v.
City of San Buenaventura, 131 Cal. Rptr. 433 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976).
120. Page Moter Co. v. Baker, 438 A.2d 739 (Conn. 1980).
121. Weldin Farms, Inc. v. Glassman, 414 A.2d 500 (Del. 1980).
122. Westland Skating Center, Inc. v. Gus Machado Buick, Inc., 542 So. 2d 959
(Fla. 1989).
123. Rodrigues v. State, 472 P.2d 509, 516 (Haw. 1970) ("our decisions so
closely approach the reasonable use rule that it is incumbent upon us to adopt it").
124. Klutey v. Commonwealth, 428 S.W.2d 766 (Ky. Ct. App. 1968).
125. von Henneberg v. Generazio, 531 N.E.2d 563 (Mass. 1988); Tucker v.
Badoian, 384 N.E.2d 1195 (Mass. 1978) (Kaplan, J., concurring).
126. Evers v. Willaby, 444 N.W.2d 856 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989); Quist v.
Kroening, 410 N.W.2d 5 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
127. Hall v. Wood, 443 So. 2d 834 (Miss. 1983).
128. County of Clark v. Powers, 611 P.2d 1072 (Nev. 1980).
129. Dudley v. Beckey, 567 A.2d 573 (N.H. 1989); Micucci v. White Mountain
Trust Co., 321 A.2d 573 (N.H. 1974).
130. Armstrong v. Francis Corp., 120 A.2d 4 (N.J. 1956).
131. Pendergrast v. Aiken, 236 S.E.2d 787 (N.C. 1977) (applies to surface water
drainage problems that are to be resolved under a nuisance theory).
132. Martin v. Weckerly, 364 N.W.2d 93 (N.D. 1985).
133. McGlashan v. Spade Rockledge Terrace Condo. Dev. Corp., 402 N.E.2d
1196 (Ohio 1980).
134. Butler v. Bruno, 341 A.2d 735 (R.I. 1975).
135. Sanford v. University of Utah, 488 P.2d 741 (Utah 1971).
136. Morris Assoc., Inc. v. Priddy, 383 S.E.2d 770 (W. Va. 1989).
137. Crest Chevrolet-Oldsmobile-Cadillac, Inc. v. Willemsen, 384 N.W.2d 692
(Wis. 1986); State v. Deetz, 224 N.W.2d 407 (Wis. 1974).
138. Lee v. Brown, 357 P.2d 1106 (Wyo. 1960) (lower court adopted civil law
rule, but Wyoming Supreme Court declined to address what rule of surface water law
the state should adopt).
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rule.13 9 Instead of being a small minority, reasonable use jurisdictions have
become the majority. Eight of the jurisdictions listed in the article as
following the common enemy rule have switched to the reasonable use
rule.' 4° Of the jurisdictions listed as following the civil law rule, five have
switched to the reasonable use rule.4 The remaining jurisdictions adopting
the reasonable use rule were not included in the 1940 survey. 42
Why are jurisdictions moving away from the common enemy and civil
law rules to the reasonable use rule? 143 The best way to discover why
courts have moved toward the reasonable use rule is to analyze the reasons
given by the courts. Because the primary exodus has been from the common
enemy rule, the following discussion will focus on why the courts have
rejected the common enemy rule in favor of the reasonable use rule.
As stated above, the reasonable use rule introduced the tort principle of
reasonableness to surface water law. This rule has served as a middle ground
to the harsher results produced by the civil law rule and the common enemy
rule. The primary reason the courts have turned to the reasonable use rule is
flexibility.'" The need for flexibility has increased as courts have realized
that problems associated with surface waters are as varied and unique as the
land that is involved.'45 Because the reasonableness of a landowner's
139. Cf Kinyon & McClure, supra note 6, at 908 (where only two jurisdictions
had adopted the reasonable use rule).
140. Those jurisdictions are Connecticut, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Jersey,
North Dakota, Rhode Island, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Id. at 902-04; see supra
notes 120, 125, 127, 130, 132, 134, 136 and accompanying text.
141. Those jurisdictions are California, Kentucky, Nevada, North Carolina, and
Ohio. Kinyon & McClure, supra note 6, at 896-97; see supra notes 119, 124, 128,
131, 133 and accompanying text.
142. Those jurisdictions arc Alaska, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, and Utah. See
Kinyon & McClure, supra note 6.
143. The movement in some states from one of these traditional rules to the
reasonable use rule has been described as an evolution. Bridges, supra note 1, at 94.
Kinyon and McClure described the process in Minnesota as: "First, the unqualified
common enemy rule; then specific exceptions; then the 'qualified' common enemy
rule; and finally, the gradual adoption of the reasonable use principle as the sole test."
Id. at 94-95 (quoting Kinyon and Mcclure, supra note 6, at 935).
144. State ex el. Comm'r of Transp. v. Rosenblum, 491 A.2d 27, 30 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1985); see also Argyclan v. Haviland, 435 N.E.2d 973, 976 (Ind. 1982)
(advantage of reasonable use rule is flexibility).
145. Argyelan, 435 N.E.2d at 987 (citing Rounds v. Hoelscher, 428 N.E.2d 1308,
1312 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981)) (modem surface water disputes are extremely fact sensitive
and require certain amount of flexibility (Hunter, J., dissenting)).
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actions are determined by a variety of factors on a case-by-case basis,"4
courts are better able to address the unique aspects of each situation.
Of course, in the legal arena, the opponent of flexibility is predictability.
Courts still clinging to the common enemy and civil law rules cite lack of
predictability as the primary reason for not adopting the reasonable use rule.
They take comfort in the predictability of the earlier rules. 47 These courts
have expressed the fear that adopting the reasonable use rule will result "in
confusion and more litigation due to the uncertainty of the parties as to their
rights.u'1
Jurisdictions adopting the reasonable use rule have addressed the concern
of lack of predictability. Rejecting the civil law rule in favor of the
reasonable use rule, the Nevada Supreme Court was not convinced by the
predictability argument:
Our review of the case law and literature reveals that the natural flow rule
does not provide more predictable results than the reasonable use rule. In
addition, we refuse to elevate an abstraction, such as 'predictability,' into
a judicial pardon for unreasonable conduct.149
Courts also have recognized that all of the modifications and qualifications of
the common enemy and civil law rules have diminished the predictability of
those rules."' 0
One of the most often cited principles behind the common enemy rule is
that it encourages the development of land by allowing developers to alter the
flow of surface water without incurring liability.' Originally, this theory
was supported by the agrarian view that landowners should be able to do
146. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
147. See Mitchell v. Mackin, 376 So. 2d 684, 688-89 (Ala. 1979);Argyelan, 435
N.E.2d at 976
148. Mitchell, 376 So. 2d at 688.
149. County of Clark v. Powers, 611 P.2d 1072, 1076 (Nev. 1980) (citation
omitted); see also Westland Skating Center, Inc. v. Gus Machado Buick, Inc., 542 So.
2d 959, 963 (Fla. 1989) ("Predictability should not be achieved at the expense of
justice.").
150. Butler v. Bruno, 341 A.2d 735, 741 (R.I. 1975) ("[w]ith the numerous
judicial exceptions and modifications that have been appended through the years...
we fail to see how the modem versions of either afford more predictability than the
rule of reasonable use"); Pendergrast v. Aiden, 236 S.E.2d 787, 796 (N.C. 1977) ("the
adoption of exceptions, most of which incorporate some element of reasonable use, has
resulted in uncertainty of the law and reduced predictability which is the chief virtue
of the civil law rule").
151. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
1992]
15
Graham: Graham: Reasonable Use Rule
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1992
MISSOURI LAWREVIEW
whatever they wished with their property.1 In Argyelan v. Haviland,5 3
the majority of the Indiana Supreme Court refused to abandon the common
enemy rule, but a strong dissent by Judge Hunter explained why the history
of land development has led other jurisdictions to adopt the reasonable use
rule:
[The technological ability to pave massive areas of ground surface was not
developed until after the inception of the common enemy doctrine:
similarly, the ability to radically alter natural drainage patterns and ground
surfaces has followed from the creation of massive earth moving machines.
Together with these developments, as well as refinements in the construc-
tion industry and changes in our shopping patterns, the last years have
yielded an urban landscape dotted with giant commercial structures and vast
shopping malls and plazas. The paved parking areas necessary to serve the
customers of these various business enterprises lie in tight geographical
juxtaposition with high density residential housing. Major quantities of
surface water from falling rain and melting snow, once absorbed into the
ground are now rcpcllcd from vast roofs and parking lots and seek lower
ground via unnatural drainage patterns.154
As Judge Hunter pointed out, we no longer live in an agrarian society.
Urbanization has changed the landscape of America and the old view of
landowner dominance to the view that landowners must take responsibility for
harm caused to others. This new point of view is reflected in the current
belief that adjoining landowners should not solely bear the costs of economic
development. 5 5  Landowners, developers, and local officials are now
required to account and plan for these costs as part of their construction
costs. 56
With the terrain of modern cities and towns and the accepted view that
landowners should act reasonably so as not to injure their neighbors, both the
common enemy and the civil law rules are outdated principles by which to
resolve surface water disputes. The civil law rule is outdated because, as
suggested above, disputes involving surface water today often result from the
unnatural drainage of surface water.157 The natural flow of water now is
152. Argyelan v. Haviland, 435 N.E.2d 973, 986 (Ind. 1982) (Hunter, J.,
dissenting).
153. 435 N.E.2d 973 (mId. 1982).
154. Id. at 987; see also County of Clark v. Powers, 611 P.2d 1072, 1076 (Nev.
1980) (under reasonable use rule "growth and urbanization are not unduly restricted,
but merely tempered with elements of order, planning, and reasonableness").
155. County of Clark, 611 P.2d at 1076.
156. Id.
157. Argyelan, 435 N.E.2d at 987 (Hunter, J., dissenting).
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usually difficult, if not impossible, to determine. The common enemy rule is
outdated in that the development it sought to encourage has been accompanied
by the potential of "self-help engineering contests in which the winner [is] the
person who most effectively turn[s] the excess water upon his neighbor's
land." 158
Consequently, one of the advantages to the reasonable use rule frequently
cited by courts is its ability to adapt to changing socio-economic circumstanc-
es without the need for modifications and qualification. 159 In the influential
case of Armstrong v. Francis Corp.,'60 then Judge Brennan of the New
Jersey Supreme Court noted that "[s]ocial progress and the common well
being are in actuality better served by a just and right balancing of the
competing interest according to the general principles of fairness and common
sense which attend the application of the rule of reason.'
61
Other reasons listed by courts adopting the rule include: (1) it can be
applied effectively and fairly in any factual setting,' 62 (2) it obviates the
necessity of difficult evidentiary determinations as to whether the natural flow
has been altered by man;1 63 (3) it reaches the same results as the qualifica-
tions to the other rules;164 and (4) no rational distinction exists requiring
courts to exclude surface water from the realm of nuisance principles.' 65
Sometimes the developmental process of the most equitable rule of law
is slower than the social progress that makes such a rule necessary. This is
the case in the area of surface water law. Courts have recognized the
harshness and inequities resulting from the civil law and common enemy
rules. They have even attempted to mitigate this harshness with modifications
such as reasonableness or due care. These modifications, however, still do not
provide the flexibility that is needed to produce fair results in this fact-
sensitive area of the law. As more courts slowly move toward the reasonable
use rule, perhaps the fear of change will dissipate and additional courts will
discover a more satisfactory approach in the reasonable use rule.
158. Westland Skating Center, Inc. v. Gus Machado Buick, Inc., 542 So. 2d 959,
961 (Fla. 1989).
159. Pendergrast v. Aiken, 236 S.E.2d 787,796 (N.C. 1977) (reasonable use rule
has capacity to accommodate changing social needs without occasioning the
unpredictable disruption associated with exceptions to the civil law rule).
160. 120 A.2d 4, 10 (N.J. 1956).
161. Id.
162. Pendergrast, 236 S.E.2d at 796-97.
163. Id.
164. Rodrigues v. Stale, 472 P.2d 509,515 (Haw. 1970) (because it accomplishes
same results, court finds it easiest to adopt reasonable use rule).
165. Argyelan, 435 N.E.2d at 989 (Hunter, J., dissenting).
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IV. MISSOURI SURFACE WATER LAW
In 1884, Missouri adopted the common enemy rule as the law of surface
water in Missouri. 16 The case of McCormick v. Kansas City, St. J. &
C.B.R.R.,1 67 has been recognized as the leading Missouri case on the
common enemy rule.1 a The Missouri Supreme Court stated the general rule
in Missouri as follows:
[P]ersons may so occupy and improve their land, and use it for such
purposes as they may see fit, either by grading or filling up low places, or
by erecting buildings thereon, or by making any other ... profitable or
desirable enjoyment; and it makes no difference that the effect of such
improvement is to change the flow of the surface water accumulating or
falling on the surrounding country, so as to either increase or diminish the
quantity of such water, which had previously flowed upon the land of the
adjoining proprietors to their inconvenience or injury.16 9
The harshness of this rule is so obvious that the same court that delivered
it tempered it by adding "[b]ut persons exercising this right to improve and
ameliorate the condition of their own land, must exercise it in a careful and
prudent way.1 70 This language established the "due care" modification in
Missouri surface water law.
Missouri also adopted the "collection and discharge" modification.
Missouri courts have distinguished, however, the collection and discharge of
surface water via a natural drainway and the collection and discharge via an
artificial drainway.1 73 A landowner is permitted to collect and discharge
166. Abbott v. Kansas City, St. Joseph & Council Bluffs R.R., 83 Mo. 271
(1884). For an extensive discussion of the history of Missouri surface water law, see
Davis, supra note 6, at 154-65.
167. 57 Mo. 433 (1874).
168. Davis, supra note 6, at 159.
169. Id. at 159-60 (quoting McCormick, 57 Mo. at 447).
170. Id. at 160.
171. See Roberts v. Hocker, 610 S.W.2d 321 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (diversion of
surface water only allowed upon an exercise of due care and prudence); cf Missouri
Land Co. v. Liberty Township, 510 S.W.2d 473, 4767 n.3 & 4 (Mo. 1974) (en banc);
Camden Special Road Dist. of Ray County v. Taylor, 495 S.W.2d 93, 98 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1973) (the proviso "reasonable care and prudence" does not in any way modify
or limit the basic and inherent right constituting the heart and core of the common
enemy doctrine, that a landowner may ward off surface water even though it damages
his neighbor); Bridges, supra note 1, at 89.
172. Bridges, supra note 1, at 90.
173. Haferkamp v. City of Rock Hill, 316 S.W.2d 620, 627 (Mo. 1958); see also
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surface water in a concentrated flow provided the flow is discharged into a
natural drainage channel and the owner acts without negligence and does not
exceed the natural capacity of the drainway to the detriment of her neigh-
bor.174
To simplify this complex area, the Missouri Supreme Court in Looney v.
Hindman,7 ' recited three general situations in which an upper landowner
would be liable for the discharge of surface water onto his lower neighbor's
property: "1) the collection of surface water into an artificial channel or the
volume and discharge of it is increased in destructive quantities upon the
servient property to its damage; 2) the draining off of surface waters in such
a manner as to exceed the natural capacity of the drainways; and 3) the
discharge of surface waters onto adjacent lands to which it would not naturally
drain. ,n'
76
It has been generally accepted in Missouri that a lower landowner will
not be liable when obstructing the flow of surface water "even though the
effect on the upper landowner would be highly predictable."'" Missouri
courts have not even inquired into the reasonableness of the lower land-
owner's conduct.1 78 The construction of dams and dikes by lower landown-
ers has been approved as a defense against the onslaught of surface water.
179
Despite the national trend to the reasonable use doctrine, Missouri
continues to hold fast to the modified common enemy doctrine," even
Kirkham v. Wright, 760 S.W.2d 474, 484-85 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988); Pollock v. Rose,
708 S.W.2d 218, 219 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (landowners not protected by common
enemy doctrine if they unnecessarily collect water and discharge it at one place
creating damage to their neighbors); Schifferdecker v. Willis, 621 S.W.2d 65, 67 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1981) (defending landowners may not unnecessarily collect water and
discharge it at one place causing damage to their neighbors); Borgman v. Florissant
Dev. Co., 515 S.W.2d 189, 194 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974) (conduct privileged where
defendant collected and discharged surface water into a natural drainway without
exceeding the natural capacity of the drainway); Polich v. Hermann, 219 S.W.2d 849,
855 (Mo. Ct. App. 1949) (landowners cannot collect surface water into an artificial
channel or volume and discharge it to the injury of their neighbors).
174. Wells v. State Highway Comm'n, 503 S.W.2d 689, 691-92 (Mo. 1973);
Haferkamp, 316 S.W.2d at 625-26; Roberts, 610 S.W.2d at 327.
175. 649 S.W.2d 207 (Mo. 1983) (en banc).
176. Id. at 211; see also Concannon v. Hanley Dev. Corp., 769 S.W.2d 183, 186-
87 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (citing Looney, 649 S.W.2d at 207).
177. M.H. Seigfried Real Estate v. City of Independence, 649 S.W.2d 893,896-97
(Mo. 1983) (en banc); see Thomas v. Estate of Ducat, 769 S.W.2d 819, 822 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1989).
178. M.H. Seigfried Real Estate, 649 S.W.2d at 897.
179. Schifferdecker v. Willis, 621 S.W.2d 65, 76 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981).
180. M.H. Siegfried Real Estate, 649 S.W.2d at 898.
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though at least one appellate court has advocated the reasonable use rule. In
Roberts v. Hocker,'81 the appellants appealed from a judgment in favor of
neighboring landowners. The lower court found that the neighboring
landowners were not negligent and did not exceed the natural capacity of the
stream when they diverted surface water onto appellant's land through
artificial tubes, thereby causing damage to the appellant's land.82 The
appellants urged the court of appeals to adopt the reasonable use approach,
reasoning that this approach was already used to define riparian rights to
watercourses, subterranean streams, and underground percolating waters.1
The court of appeals rejected this argument by distinguishing surface water
law as pertaining to the "riddance" of water, while riparian rights go to the
"use of water."'' 4
The court of appeals went on to note that the modified common enemy
rule does take reasonableness into account through the "due care" and
"collection and discharge" qualification." s The court, however, recognized
that these modifications may no longer be sufficient. "We may well agree that
the reality of modem urban life requires that an even more considerate rule of
reason apply so that the basis of liability [at least as to urban areas] becomes
whether the benefit of the improvement to one landowner outweighs the harm
resultant to another."''1
Despite this type of advocacy by at least one court of appeals, the
Missouri Supreme Court has clearly expressed its intention to maintain the
modified common enemy rule as the law of Missouri. In M.H. Siegfried Real
Estate v. City of Independence,18 7 the Missouri Supreme Court addressed the
issue of whether a lower landowner can back up surface water onto an upper
landowner's property. The court held that a lower landowner may have
almost unlimited freedom in backing up water, while an upper landowner is
bound by the substantial restrictions of the modified common enemy rule.,m
While noting that such a holding creates an anomaly, the court held fast to the
common enemy rule: "[W]e do not perceive any general trend in Missouri or
elsewhere toward abandonment of the 'common enemy' rule in favor of some
other concept such as a 'reasonable use' doctrine."'8 9 The court, however,
had not been asked by the parties to reevaluate the state of the law in this area
181. 610 S.W.2d 321 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980).
182. Id. at 325
183. Id. at 327 n.5.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 328 n.5.
186. Id. I
187. 649 S.W.2d 893 (Mo. 1983) (en bane).
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and it noted that this case would not have been appropriate for such an
undertaking. 19° The statement quoted above indicates that any reevaluation
would most likely result in the modified common enemy rule remaining the
law of Missouri.
A recent Missouri case concerning surface water law is Hansen v. Gary
Naugle Construction Co.19' This case involved the issue of whether the
modified common enemy rule applies to actions against land developers
founded on nuisance and trespass." z The plaintiffs sued the defendant
(Naugle) for damages sustained as a result of an increase in the volume and
velocity of surface water runoff following Naugle's development of land lying
uphill from plaintiff's property. 93 Testimony confirmed that the develop-
ment of the upper land by Naugle caused the velocity and volume of storm
water runoff to increase by "three times from that which was normally
discharged over the plaintiffs' land by virtue of the natural drainway
patterns."1 The trial court found in favor of the plaintiffs on a "trespass
and/or nuisance" theory and awarded each plaintiff $5,800.195 The Court of
Appeals for the Western District reversed the trial court.1"
The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals and found for
the defendant. In reaching its conclusion, the court first noted that trespass
and nuisance are among the recognized exceptions to the common enemy
doctrine.197 The court rejected the trespass action, reasoning that trespass
requires some element of intent. "[A] trespass action will lie only where the
defendant undertakes some alteration of the natural drainage patterns for the
purpose of 'altering those patterns."'19 There is no trespass when the upper
landowner discharges the water where it would have gone naturally. 1"
Because the trial court did not find that the defendant discharged water outside
the natural drainway on the plaintiff's property, the action for trespass did not
lie. °
The court likewise rejected the plaintiff's nuisance theory. Nuisance is
founded on an "unreasonable, unusual or unnatural land use that substantially
190. Id.
191. 801 S.W.2d 71 (Mo. 1990) (en banc).
192. Id.
193. Id. at 72, 73.
194. Id. at 73.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 74 (citing Hawkins v. Burlington Northern, 514 S.W.2d 593,600 (Mo.
1974) (en banc)).
198. Id.
199. Id. at 74-75.
200. Id. at 75.
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impairs the right of the owners of the lower tenement to enjoy their property
peacefully."2"' In Missouri, however, it is not an "unreasonable use" to
undertake development of higher land, unless the effect of the development
becomes unreasonable because the "upper landowner discharges water outside
the natural drainway or discharges surface water onto the natural drainway in
excess of the capacity of that drainway." 21 Again, because the trial court
did not find that the discharge was outside the natural drainway, the common
enemy rule defeated the plaintiff's nuisance cause of action.203
The Missouri Supreme Court stated its holding as follows: "A developer
may 'collect surface water [on its property] in artificial drains and precipitate
it into a natural drainway channel thereon ... even though in doing so they
might increase and accelerate the flow of the surface water in its natural canal
into the land of the plaintiffs. '"004 The court stated that it saw no need to
alter this rule.205
This case is an excellent example of the harshness of the common enemy
rule and the inadequacies of its exceptions. The trial court found that the
defendant had collected surface water and discharged it in "destructive and
increased quantities" resulting in injury to the adjoining landowners.2 6 Yet,
the plaintiffs were not allowed to recover because the defendant had not
exceeded the capacity of the natural drainway. Under this rule, developers
will be able to take advantage of lower landowners and save themselves
substantial construction costs by developing land where there is a natural
drainway and by making sure that their alteration of the land does not cause
the flow of surface water to exceed the capacity of the drainway. Significant
damage to the innocent lower landowner could still occur and the upper
landowner would bear no responsibility. Under Hansen, it appears the upper
landowner could increase the volume and velocity of the flow by at least three
times its original capacity and avoid liability, even though damage to the
lower landowner occurs.
V. CONCLUSION
If Missouri were to adopt the reasonable use rule, inequitable results
against lower landowners could be avoided. Each landowner would be held
201. Id. at 74 (citing Frank v. Environmental Sanitation Management, Inc., 687
S.W.2d 876, 880 (Mo. 1985) (en banc)).
202. Id. at 75.
203. Id.
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to a standard of reasonable use. Landowners would still be able to develop
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